Gates-Morin Meeting : Behind the Iran/Afghanistan Rhetoric

Discussions of Iran’s nuclear program were to be expected given Mahmoud Ahmadenijad’s ordering the country’s atomic energy organization to begin enrichment at a higher level and given concerns for its consequences for the stability of the Middle East region. This recent development lessens hopes for the Group of Six’s proposals for enriching Iranian uranium abroad for civilian purposes. Without great suspense, Secretary Gates and Minister Morin agreed to increase the international pressure on Iran in the form of sanctions. The Iranian regime has repeatedly ignored the Group of Six and the IAEA and now uses this as a strategy to serve its domestic policy by attracting the international community’s attention away from its violent repression of internal dissent.

Greater NATO troop contributions in Afghanistan have taken on new importance following President Barack Obama’s recently unveiled strategy for the country. While the plan revealed during a speech at West Point in early December 2009 calls for beginning to withdraw troops and hand over security duties to the Afghans in 18 months, an additional 30,000 troops are to be added before that time augmenting current troop levels to 100,000. Given the increasing unpopularity of the war among the American public, talk of withdraw is perhaps the politically prudent action to take. However, the likeliness of the new Afghanistan strategy going according to plan is unsure given the condition that handover will take place in only a context where Afghan forces are ready to take charge of the security situation.

In order to prepare the Afghans themselves to take over security duties the United States is sending 5,000 military trainers among the 30,000 committed troops. For their part, following the meeting between Senator Gates and Minister Morin, the French committed 80 military instructors as part of an Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT). Though not expressing it, the Americans were certainly disappointed by what many consider an insufficient commitment from the French. Of course, domestic politics are at play in given the massive unpopularity of the war in Afghanistan among the French public and the fast approaching regional elections next month. Moreover, such a lack of enthusiasm for European states to contribute troops in general may point to an overarching feeling that efforts in Afghanistan are futile.

The most obvious issues out in the open, Minister Morin would take the opportunity to press for French defense industry interests by “reminding” Secretary Gates of his hope the European defense group EADS would “benefit from conditions of free competition” and that a country defending market liberalism must assure these conditions in both directions. This was, of course, in reference to the EADS-Northrup Grumman partnership’s bid to provide the United States Air Force with 179 KC-45 tanker/mid-air refueling aircraft. While the contract was originally awarded to the partnership, after protests from Boeing the contest was reopened in mid 2008.

Another point of Franco-American disaccord concerns arms sales to Russia. As negotiations are in process for France to provide four “Mistral” amphibious assault and helicopter transport ships. Eastern European states have expressed their outrage over possibilities of an increase in Russian sea-power through French military sales. Secretary Gates, refusing to comment in detail, merely stated that the issue was in fact discussed with Minister Morin. The next day, following a meeting with President Nicolas Sarkozy, the Secretary elaborated his concerns, stating “it is more a problem of the message being sent than a military issue.” The “message” Secretary Gates refers to may be interpreted as a lack of solidarity among NATO countries which feel under threat by Russia, especially coming from a France only recently reintegrated in to NATO’s command structure.

The French position is officially based on the desire to build goodwill and to break from what is perceived as a Cold War mentality vis-à-vis Russia. Little emphasis is placed on the commercial nature. Arnaud Dubien, IRIS’s Russia expert explains that “the shipyards of Saint-Nazaire are currently building a third ’Mistral’ for the French Navy, but starting from next year, there are no [new] orders…building a ‘Mistral’ employs about 1,500 people for nearly two years, and it would have been very difficult for the French government to explain to the future unemployed that there was an order, but that we refused to honor it.”

Concerns over domestic jobs are interesting to note on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) is a limit on the export of technology to non-US persons. The Europeans often assert that ITAR is nothing more than an opportunistic means for the United States to protect domestic jobs, keep its position as an overwhelming power in terms of technology and manipulate the foreign policies of states who wish to gain access to American military know-how. Reform of ITAR regulations to allow for greater technology access for American allies has been pushed by the Department of Defense and the Executive branch, starting with Bill Clinton and later, after some initial hesitation, the Bush administration. With the United Kingdom, the UK-US Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT) has been signed but is still awaiting Senate ratification. This treaty greatly streamlines technology transfers and trade in defense materials between the two countries. Of course, the United Kingdom has a special relationship with the United States that France does not enjoy, however interesting to note is that even with this special relationship and a coordinated foreign policy there is resistance to the DTCT coming from the United States Senate.

Such trade restrictions have led Europeans to take varying approaches in order to enter the American market. Since European firms may not be able to access certain technologies even when operating in the United States, modular production or, in the case of Thales, a ‘multi-domestic’ strategy are solutions for transatlantic cooperation. Although such strategies are wrought with economic inefficiencies such as reproduction, there are often the only solutions. In the case of EADS, partnerships with American firms are the strategy and in the case of less sensitive equipment such as a tanker aircraft technology restrictions are less of a hindrance. While the KC-45 bid by EADS-Northrop Grumman offered the best deal for the United States in purely bottom line terms, various Senators rejected that the deal would offer jobs in France instead of exclusively in the United States as would be the case in the event of Boeing. It is highly possible that the United States will pay Boeing for a less desirable contract in order to keep domestic jobs than to convene the deal with EADS-Northrop Grumman which risks losing some possibilities of job creation.

Economically the United States makes less than optimal decisions in its arms procurement in order to protect jobs. At a security, political level technology transfer restrictions limit NATO interoperability, prevent allies from developing their defense capabilities and risks politically alienating those allies. The United States misses opportunities to create economies of scale and scope through transatlantic cooperation, may grant unfavorable contracts and risks creating a domestic military industrial complex monopoly which would shift power from the state to private enterprises. On the other hand, France, in its desire to boost domestic employment, is pursuing a rather different strategy. The “Mistral” controversy illustrates well France’s perhaps over zealousness to export defense materials. Indeed, one reason for its disadvantaged status in terms of American technology transfer is its reluctance to place restrictions on its exports or on re-exporting systems containing American-origin technology. The consequences of such a transfer do not bode well for the future possibilities of France’s industry in the American market, a market actively sought out, seem unimportant from the French perspective and appear short-sighted. Moreover, concerns of NATO members, implications for cohesion inside NATO, and a growingly aggressive Russia seem to be of little concern to France if it means the creation of jobs in the shipbuilding sector. Finally, the temporal proximity of the announcement of the “Mistral” deal and the Minister Morin’s EADS lobbying may be perceived among certain American circles as a form of blackmail.

In the end, domestic jobs will continue to take priority over intelligent economics, transatlantic cooperation and prudent foreign policy.