Northern Ireland : More volatile a position than would appear

In February a car bomb exploded, damaging the Court building in Newry, Co. Down and in March 2009 two British soldiers were shot dead by the Real IRA outside the army barracks in Massereene, County Antrim. Also in March 2009 Constable Stephen Carroll was shot dead by the Continuity IRA in Craigavon, Co. Armagh. Constable Carroll’s killing, as well as Monday’s bomb attack, draws into sharp focus the fact that for significant factions in the North, the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Assembly remain wholly unacceptable as a future path.

The IRA is currently spit into three factions : the Provisional IRA, the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA. The ‘Provisional IRA’ formed as a result of a split in the Irish Republican Army in 1969, over differences in ideology about how to respond to violence against nationalists. In 1986 the continuity IRA emerged, claiming to represent the ideology of the original IRA prior to the 1969 split. The ‘Real IRA’ formed as a result of a split in 1997 between members of the ‘Provisional IRA’. Those that would subsequently form the Real IRA rejected the Provisional IRA ceasefire of 1997 and the Belfast Agreement, which paved the way for talks and culminated in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. They maintained the goal of a united Ireland, through force. The bombing of Omagh, Co. Down, in August 1998 was the ultimate expression of this rejection. For the ‘Real IRA’, a Northern Ireland Assembly with indeterminate, even negligible ties to London is as unacceptable as direct rule form Westminster.

Constable Carroll was a Catholic policeman. He formerly served in the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) and then in the renamed PSNI (Police Service of Northern Ireland) that emerged as a stipulation of the 1998 Agreement. His killing represented an expression of the new antagonisms and dissimulations that have arisen within the Catholic and Nationalist communities in the North of Ireland. A Catholic man, born in the Republic but an agent of the new Northern Ireland Assembly, for dissident groups he represented a position as unacceptable as any that had been imposed from London. He perhaps, in their eyes, represented an even greater level of unacceptability, being a Catholic with traditional Irish roots but accepting and acting for an institution seen to be undermining the possibility of Irish unity. For dissident ‘Continuity’ and ‘Real’ IRA groups the northern institution represents a form of definitive structure that is seen as an obstacle to the realisation of a united Ireland. It is against the backdrop of this dissident rejection of the new institution that Monday’s bomb attack was carried out. Monday saw the formal transfer of policing and justice powers from Westminster to Stormont. This is the final part of the Good Friday Agreement and has proved to be one of the most contentious issues pertaining to the new Northern governance structures. Sinn Fein, the nationalist party in the north, had pressed for devolution, while Unionist parties, principally the Democratic Unionist Party have been cautious, maintaining that the northern policing and justice institutions have until now lacked the development and capacity to allow devolution to proceed. Monday’s attack was not an attack by mainstream IRA elements against the situation in the North but rather a further registration by dissident elements of their rejection of the political process in the North and the shape it has taken since 1997. The attack was timed to coincide with the final piece of this political process and its formal implementation.

Since 1998 the Provisional IRA has been able to maintain its officiate status among the more hard line nationalist following, it being the largest faction. The ‘Real’ and ‘Continuity’ IRA have been seen as dissident groupings, unrepresentative of the majority of hard-line nationalist sentiment. This situation has endured since 1997. It has, however, run concurrent to the presence of an extremely strong Labour government in Westminster. The coming to power of the first Blair government in 1997 bred new impetus into the Northern Ireland Peace Process. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly the Labour Party in Britain has historically been more inclined to view the North from a more balanced perspective, while the British Conservative Party has maintained closer historical ties to Northern Ireland Unionism. Labour was, thus, more willing to embrace a dynamic strategy towards engaging both the Nationalist and Unionist communities. Secondly, this historic Labour position, less sympathetic to Unionist sentiment, had in 1997 been given a strong mandate and thus was able to counter Unionist demands with more confidence and without fear of having its government undermined or its position weakened. The previous Conservative government under John Major had been unable to do this, having a much weaker majority and relying on pro-Unionist political elements both in Northern Ireland and in Britain.

The upcoming general election in Britain and the probable Conservative government that will emerge pose significant challenges to stability in Northern Ireland. A government under David Cameron will, for historical and practical reasons, take a more sympathetic line regarding Unionist parties in Stormont. Such a political environment would have little impact on dissident nationalist sentiment, which rejects the Northern Assembly in every circumstance. However, the initial months of the Assembly following the insertion of the final piece of the jigsaw, the dissolution of policing and justice powers, are crucial to how the final shape of the Assembly is perceived by both Nationalist and Unionist communities. There is a strong inclination for Peter Robinson, the DUP leader, to articulate a robust Unionist position following the personal challenges he has recently experienced and the support he is seeking to recoup from religious DUP members as a result. The second major Unionist party in the North, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), opposed devolution and Cameron was unable to convince the UUP to change its vote, despite an electoral alliance between the Conservatives and the UUP ahead of the UK election this May. The question is not so much one of the Conservative Party’s agenda itself. Cameron himself has supported devolution, although he would seek to bolster Conservative sentiment in the North and some have questioned his ability and willingness to act as an honest broker in Northern Ireland as Prime Minister. The question is whether or not the Conservatives will emerge with a strong majority in May. If the Conservatives emerge from May’s election with a precarious majority, or indeed, if they emerge as the largest party in a hung parliament, as some polls have suggested, then they may be held hostage by unionist parties in the North peddling a traditional unionist tone. The same can be applied, to a lesser extent to a Labour win, but this looks unlikely.

A robust articulation of Unionism by the DUP and the UUP and the political confidence that might follow from the knowledge that Westminster is to a greater extent predisposed to Unionist sentiment, for the first time since 1997, could have profound results for Nationalist attitudes towards the Assembly. A strengthened Unionist agenda, with greater British Government support, would lead to disillusionment with Sinn Fein, the principal nationalist political party in Stormont. This could, among more extreme IRA members and sympathisers, result in a bolstered support for those dissident elements previously spurned. If the project that the Provisional IRA has supported for twelve years is seen to protect and represent Unionism, with strong support from London, support for that wing of the IRA could dwindle, notably among those more willing to carry out violent attacks.

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