A GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE FRENCH EU PRESIDENCY

Par Fabio Liberti, chercheur à l’IRIS

While it is difficult to summarize France’s six-month Presidency of the EU, especially in view of the fact that the president in question is of such a hyper active nature as President Sarkozy, this article aims to provide a brief assessment of this whirlwind semester which has been particularly dense due to the chosen priorities and also due to unforeseen events which have dominated current affairs. The Irish rejection of the Lisbon treaty in June 2008 put a spanner in the works for the French action plan before it even got off the ground. Close on its heels was the Russo-Georgian conflict in August and the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers and the economic and financial crisis which ensued. These events called for swift action on the part of the French presidency to modify their action plan accordingly. The article consists of three sections. Firstly the initial objectives of the presidency will be described, followed by the actual results obtained. Finally, these results will be analysed in the context of the overall achievements of the French presidency.

First and foremost, it is important to recall the situation in which President Sarkozy took the reigns of the EU. France had all but disappeared from the European political map between 2005 and 2007, following the French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 referendum, opted for by Jacques Chirac. Indeed, the end of Chirac’s mandate was characterised as an absolute immobilisation of the EU. On taking power, Nicolas Sarkozy courageously affirmed that he would find a solution to the European deadlock and that a more simplified treaty would be renegotiated and passed by parliamentary vote, thereby avoiding a second referendum. While it is true that the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which ironically the President insisted on calling the simplified version despite the fact that it was twice the size of its predecessor, is due in part to the energy of the new President, it is in fact Angela Merkel who deserves the most praise. Indeed, this provided a taster of what characterizes the French president, that is, his hyperactivity and his propensity to take the praise for actions which are not entirely down to him, much to the annoyance of some European leaders, Angela Merkel to name but one.

The French Presidency, while highly anticipated, as French and German presidencies have historically made substantial progress, was also met with guarded skepticism due to some of Sarkozy’s more controversial standpoints. Defending the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), repeatedly undermining the European Central Bank and the then European Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, making off the cuff propositions such as reducing the VAT on hydrocarbons and repeatedly rejecting Turkish accession gave the impression of an arrogant presidency.

Sarkozy’s primary objectives were firstly to show the world that France was back in Europe and to reclaim the influence that France had lost by the end of Chirac’s mandate and secondly to make progress on the issues that have historically been an integral part of French foreign policy. The French Presidency was prepared a long time in advance and with a lot of skill from Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the former State Secretary for European affairs of the Fillon government. Four main priorities were identified. Firstly, tackling immigration with a view to adopting a European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. Secondly, reforming the CAP, by availing of the overlap between the French presidency and the assessment of the CAP provided for in the 2003 reform. Thirdly, making progress with the climate-energy package, with the aim of implementing the 20-20-20 agreement of 2007. The instrument aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increase the use of renewable energy by 20% and increase energy efficiency by 20% and all this by 2020. The final priority identified was the reviving of the European Security and Defence Policy by creating a commanding and planning unit for ESDP missions, revising the European Security Strategy and defining the rules governing Permanent Structured Cooperation provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. A further fifth priority of establishing the Union for the Mediterranean was subsequently added. This was strongly desired by President Sarkozy and was officially launched in Paris, on the 12th and 13th July.

The advantage of establishing such priorities was that they were not only efficient in terms of French domestic politics (European defence issues after the announcement of the French reintegration into NATO military commandment, immigration, environment, and defending the CAP) but also on a European level. Since the Nice Treaty in 2001, Europe has been bogged down in circular debates on the institutions and this has caused the European citizens to gradually become more distanced from the issues of European construction. This debate is particularly significant in France where the public opinion is becoming increasingly skeptical of European construction, which is associated with a bureaucratic and ultra-liberal agenda, removed from the citizen’s concerns. In establishing the concept of European protection and selecting these priorities, Nicolas Sarkozy along with Jean-Pierre Jouyet aimed firstly to show the French public that with strong political will and active diplomacy the EU could progress, and secondly to prove to European leaders that France was intent on being the driving force behind European construction.

Have they succeeded ? Although the immediate effects point to the positive, the French presidency can only really be evaluated in one or two years’ time. If by that time European construction has progressed and the unending diplomatic debates on whether the i’s are dotted and the t’s are crossed have become a thing of the past, then it will be possible to say that Sarkozy changed European construction. If this is not the case, then all that will be left will be memories of a hyperactive leader, some headlines and little of anything substantial.

Priorities and Results

The chosen priorities were more or less maintained and important agreements were achieved during the presidency, with the exception of the revival of the ESDP. Regarding immigration, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was unanimously adopted at the European Council meeting of October 15th. This was one of Sarkozy’s long-standing issues. He had mentioned this proposition at an informal meeting between the six largest European countries in September 2006. Moreover, during his presidential campaign, Sarkozy capitalized on the fear of illegal immigration and swept up Jean-Marie Le Pen’s and the Front National’s support. The French presidency aimed to make it impossible to grant large amnesties to illegal immigrants within the EU. Italy and Spain having resorted to this method in the past (for example Spain regularised 600 000 illegal workers in 2005), were indirectly targeted and Spain put up the most resistance to the adoption of this instrument. The French presidency argued that such a measure was necessary for the Schengen area, which allows the unrestricted circulation of workers once they were regularised by a member state. A further aim of the presidency was to harmonise asylum laws throughout Europe so that asylum seekers cannot make simultaneous demands in a number of states. The pact confines itself to anticipating the establishment of a uniform asylum concession system by 2012 at the latest. The document does not however specify the bases of this standardization, being an agreement politically and not legally binding.

Neither juridical restrictions nor an explicit engagement are contained in the pact. It does however contain certain issues which Sarkozy holds dear, such as selective immigration, the importance of the integration of immigrants, even though the concept of an integration contract was taken out of the text due to pressure from Spain, Germany and Austria. The structure of the text was also softened due to pressure from the Scandianvian countries, who feared the birth of Fortress Europe. The principle of repatriation of illegal immigrants was also mentioned, in line with the return directive adopted by the European parliament in June 2008, as was the reinforcement of the Frontex agency. The Pact can be considered a political success, as reaching an agreement on such a sensitive topic is never easy, nevertheless the practical effects of the pact are yet to be seen.

Concerning the Union for the Mediterranean, the results of this endeavour are questionable. Indeed, the new union appears to repeat the same mistakes of the Barcelona Process. As long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved, it is doubtful that any serious headway can be made in the area. The situation is however drastic : stagnant development and an increasingly unmanageable labour market in the southern Mediterranean makes the area extremely worrying. The EU has to take the area in hand if migratory tensions are to be avoided. Despite all this, Nicolas Sarkozy appeared to act according to political considerations, such as the desire to offer Turkey an alternative to EU accession and also to shift the EU’s external sphere of influence from Germany in the East to France in the South. Diplomatically speaking, the Paris conference was a success and provided Sarkozy with the opportunity to be seen as the principle EU actor in the region. However, regarding the long term results of the venture, as long as the EU is not a principle actor in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, any real improvement in the area is highly improbable.

The climate-energy package can be considered a major success of the French presidency. The 20-20-20 objectives were defined during the German presidency in March 2007 by the Action Plan for an Energy Policy for Europe and also by the “Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package” presented by the European Commission in January 2008. All that was left to do was to specify how to attain these objectives. After long and arduous negotiations, an agreement was finally made on December 12th 2008. The major resistance came from the Eastern EU states, who called for solidarity from the community to allow them to renew their energy industries ; from Italy, who feared the costs of adapting their industries to the post-carbon era ; and also from Germany, who was skeptical of European solidarity due to the fact that they are the largest contributors to the communal budget. Furthermore, Germany has by far the largest manufacturing sector in Europe. The adoption of this package is of particularly high political importance, due to the fact that preparations are underway for the adoption of a post-Kyoto protocol and also that American investment in increasing energy efficiency is expected with the arrival of the new administration. Tackling climate change appears to be a major turning point in the world economy after that of the new technologies in information and communication. It is therefore in the EU’s interest to lead the way in this technological revolution.

Regarding reforming the CAP, the health check of this policy was intended to assess the reform of 2003 and to pave the way for the reform of 2013. Sarkozy aimed thereby to accelerate the reform process. The CAP, which soaks up 40% of the common budget, is under increasing pressure from the Scandinavian countries, the UK, and also the European Commission who would like to see a more modern and economical CAP, more adapted to the Doha round negotiations. It is clear that the inclusion of the CAP among the French priorities was a means of ensuring French interests in this area. The main aim of the French was to cover up its protectionist image by highlighting the importance of the CAP in protecting the environment. It is highly likely that there will be a new clash between France and Britain on the CAP when new negotiations on EU financing get underway in 2009. While it is clear that the CAP needs to be radically reformed, the French presidency France did not make much headway in debates on the topic, nor for that matter on the WTO commercial negotiations.

The presidency’s priority of reviving the ESDP, before France reintegrates into NATO’s military commandment, highlights a pivotal point of France’s European politics. The dream of a strong Europe has traditionally been one of France’s ambitions and, at the same time, France’s European counterparts have always been wary of French propositions in this area. Since Victoria Nuland, the American ambassador to NATO, affirmed in London last February that the US and NATO need a strong defence system in Europe, 2008 could have been a crucial year for Europe’s defence policy. Having received the green light from the US, and having decided to reintegrate into NATO, everything appeared to be in place for a revival of the ESDP. Unfortunately the presidency’s objectives of establishing the commanding and planning unit, defining the criteria for Permanent Structured Cooperation and revising the ESS were not achieved. This was mainly due to opposition from the UK. A weakened Gordon Brown, who was 20 points down on David Cameron in July did not want to pique the public opinion’s which has traditionally been opposed to major advancements in ESDP. Nevertheless, by adapting their approach, the French presidency was in a position to achieve some results. In order to win over the British, concrete propositions were made in a bid to fill in the gaps in the EU’s competencies. Many initiatives will be launched to increase the EU’s defence capabilities : a common fleet of strategic cargo aircrafts, an aeronautical group, new programmes on space observation (Musis), transport helicopters, military Erasmus among others. While these advancements may appear to be minor and do not constitute a major boost to the ESDP, they are essential if the EU member states €200 billion defence budget is to be spent wisely.

A Proactive Presidency ?

The French presidency was upturned on several occasions by unforeseen events during its six month period. The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty blocked the institutional changes due to come into force in 2007 and the French presidency was forced to assume the task of managing the crisis which ensued. The European Council meeting on the 11th and 12th December heard the explanations of the Irish Taoiseach Brian Cowen and agreed to reassure the Irish people on what was perceived in Ireland as controversial issues of the Treaty, such as abortion, neutrality and fiscal policy in exchange for a commitment on the part of the Irish government to hold a second referendum.

Nicolas Sarkozy was also confronted with the explosion of the economic and financial crisis, whose magnitude was unimaginable just a year ago. Following the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in the US, the crisis reverberated throughout the whole world. While Paulson’s Plan failed to reassure the international financial markets, the EU President took the helm. By recycling the plan used by Gordon Brown in the UK, he succeeded in restoring a certain calm to the international markets. The decision to convene the G20 leaders was not without consequences, as it practically signed the death sentence of the G7-G8. For the first time in decades, Europe was at the forefront in the decision to rewrite international financial architecture. Admittedly, this would not have been possible without the US administration, however it must be highlighted that after the Anglo-American Bretton Woods, a new multilateral regulatory system is expected to emerge within the next few years. In the meantime however the crisis has spread from the financial sphere into the real economy. Faced with recession in the European economies, the governments reacted independently. The European stimulus plan, corresponding to measures taken by national governments plus funds from the European investment bank and the European Commission totaling €200 billions, gave a European facade to decisions that were adopted unilaterally by the member states. It also caused Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel to lock horns once again. It appears that both countries have very different interpretations of the crisis. Paris is fearful of a crisis like that of 1929 while Germany fears the return of the hyper-inflation of the 1920s. Moreover, Germany refuses to agree with a slackening of public finances management in the member states. Consequently, every common action which is 20% financed by Germany is considered as a way of paying for another country’s laxness.

Analysis

In order to understand the actions of the French presidency, one must understand Sarkozy’s vision of Europe. The French president appears to have a rather gaullist view of the European institutions. His ideal Europe would be composed of three different circles. The first would constitute a common security structure, including Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and perhaps Israel. The second circle would contain the current 27 members more Balkans states within a common market, with common institutions and where intergovernmental cooperation would dominate. The third circle would be the nucleus, and would incorporate more or less the current Eurozone plus the UK. This zone would be characterised by heightened coordination in the commercial and political economy and especially in a common defence system complementary to NATO.

Mr. Sarkozy pursued several results during this semester :

1. Firstly, asserting the preponderance of power of the European Council over the European Commission in order to reaffirm the domination of intergovernmentalism over the community-based approach. He achieved this objective thanks to the weakness of the Commission under Barroso who seems reluctant to chafe the major states in order to ensure his reelection. The risk here is that Europe may progress at different speeds due to the institutional crisis. This would not necessarily be damaging for the EU. States that are not ready to make progress on certain issues, for example on Defence policy, should not hold up the rest of the Union. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have a common institutional framework. Having spent 60 years trying to unite the continent, backtracking on this project would be a great shame.
2. Secondly, renewing the way the EU functions. In view of the aversion of the public opinion among the European citizens towards the Brussels institutions, Sarkozy aimed to show that political will can override institutional questions. The message was clear : If we really want to progress then the absence of a Treaty will not be able to hold up the politics. Here also Mr. Sarkozy’s objective was achieved. He made it possible for Europe to make progress on a number of major issues after the immobilisation of 2005 – 08. Some highlights of Sarkozy’s presidency, such as refusing to wait for the other European leaders on the doorstep of the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels, because it would have been a waste of an hour of work ; or ignoring protocol by insisting that his Minister for Sustainable Development, Jean-Louis Borloo, take part in a meeting of state leaders and pulling up the extra chair himself ; or even his memorable quote “I don’t see the interest in negotiating until 4 am for a few peanuts” marks a change in leadership style. It remains to be seen if this will outlive the president.
3. Thirdly, the will to be a strong EU leader even to the detriment of Franco-German relations. This however is a source of worry for the future of the EU. The historical motor of the EU’s engine has broken down. Mr. Sarkozy and Ms. Merkel, due to their temperament and personal background appear to be unable to get along. Indeed, on practically all of the issues of the French presidency, be it the Union for the Mediterranean, the climate-energy package, the ESDP, the stimulus package, or relations with the ECB, there was some form of Franco-German friction. French diplomats which collaborated on the French presidency are reveling in the revival of French influence within the Eurozone, and also in Eastern Europe thanks to the Gdansk meeting. Mr. Sarkozy wanted to use the end of the Bush’s mandate, the uncharismatic Medvedev, the domestic preoccupations of Ms. Merkel and Mr. Brown to impose himself as a world leader. Indeed, in Mr. Sarkozy’s vision, only Obama comes close to having the same aura as himself. If we consider Nicolas Sarkozy to be the European personality of the year, then it would appear that he has achieved his goal. However, it is questionable at what price this comes.
4. The fourth and final objective was to put the EU back on the political map and show that it is not just a huge economic machine. Sarkozy knew how to work his space, in that he was able to use the end of Bush’s mandate to his advantage to affirm the EU’s place on the international scene. The mediation in Georgia and the role played by the EU in the international financial crisis gave him good reason to make the most out of the situation.

In conclusion, taking solely the initial objectives into account, it appears that the Presidency has been rather successful. However, regarding the long-term benefits of the past six months, the outlook appears more moderated. The breakdown in Franco-German relations, or even the permanent confrontation between these two countries, will not be conducive to European progress. The weakening of the Commission is also a source of concern because the EU needs an agency capable of representing the collective interests rather than each individual member state’s interests. The decision to make the Irish hold a second referendum, while it was inevitable, exposes the EU to the possibility of further institutional crisis. Winning a second referendum during a recession will be no easy task. If Ireland rejects the Treaty for a second time, the EU will find itself faced with a rather difficult situation. The current treaties in operation do not allow countries to be excluded.

Regarding the new functioning of the EU and its role on the international scene, the Sarkozy method can only be evaluated in a year’s time after the Czech and Swedish Presidency. It is as yet uncertain if Mr. Sarkozy’s hyperactivity will have a lasting effect. With the new Obama administration, American soft power may come back into force and circumvent the EU’s room to manouevre in the international arena. Sarkozy’s team are congratulating themselves on having overlapped the Czech Presidency, which is suspected of being Euro-skeptic due to its delayed ratification of the Lisbon treaty. Indeed, the final declaration of the Council summit of 11/12 December all but contained the agenda for the next meeting in March, given the number of dossiers that have to be examined by this date, as ensured by the French Presidency. This may not necessarily be to the EU’s advantage as France runs the risk of offending other member states starting with the Czech Republic. It remains to be seen whether the French President hyperactivity will be followed with concrete results. Whether it comes to immigration, the Union for the Mediterranean, the energy-climate package and many more issues, the wheels have been set in motion and whether this will bear any fruit is not yet clear. In any case, the citizens of Europe will not accept any more deceptions, especially in a time of a sharp economic crisis.